Throughout the period 1879-1980 there have been alliances and crises that have altered the balance of power. From 1879-1945 international relations were centred in Europe and dictated by the colonial powers, France and Britain.
Growing powers such as Germany threatened their superiority which led to the First Moroccan Crisis (1905) and the Stresa Front (1935). Post WWII the balance of power shifted as the collapse of Empires left a power vacuum.
Hence the victors of the war filled the void: the USA and USSR. The two powers dominated international relations and at times were dangerously opposed as seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).
However, tensions eased during the Détente period which saw Nixon’s visit to China (1972). A turning point is a decisive moment which resulted in significant change. The Missile Crisis created change. However, its limited impact restricts its significance to the Cold War period. The Moroccan Crisis however impacted international relations to a greater degree thus making it the key turning point from 1879-1980.
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a thirteen-day episode where Soviet nuclear missiles aimed at American created a peak in Cold War tension. This was a significant change as it almost prompted the first nuclear war.
The aftermath led to improved relations between America and Russia. A mutual respect developed between them implying that tensions eased between the Powers. This was a “turning point in the discipline of international Relations” as fear of Mutually Assured Destruction led to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a direct hotline was established between them[1].
Their reluctance to embark on nuclear war resulted in a “relaxation of tension”[2]. Some historians would argue that it “did not ultimately reduce the tension between them.”[3] Despite improvements, steps towards Détente were arguably limited. Indeed, the Test Ban Treaty had limitations as it regulated testing not the production of arms. The hotline was for emergencies suggesting that for it to be used tension must again escalate to a point where collective security was valued over self-interest.
The aftermath of the Crisis saw other countries impacting international relations. France’s anxiety at US dominance led to its departure from NATO which had little impact as their influence was weaker than the Superpowers.
Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet relationship was strained which “continued to deteriorate from this point” and heightened Chinese interest in developing nuclear weapons[4]. Greater Chinese independence altered the balance of power in her favour.
Despite the emergence of a multipolar world, the Superpowers still dominated international relations. USSR was in control of many Communist nations while America heavily influenced the West leaving little room for others to exert influence.
Moreover, US agreement to not invade Cuba and the removal of their Jupiter missiles changed the balance of power as the Crisis forced Kennedy into concessions he wouldn’t have agreed to otherwise.
American success was limited as Cuba remained communist. Cuba inspired communist guerrilla rebels which dictated US foreign policy as it aimed to prevent the spread of communism in South America as they “would not tolerate another Cuba”[5].
This had minimal impact as communism was rejected as seen in Bolivia where Che Guevara, a communist revolutionary, was assassinated. Therefore Cuba could do little to challenge America’s dominance in the region.
Therefore, the Missile Crisis was not the key turning point during 1879-1980 as many of its outcomes produced continuity, although its significance cannot be ignored during the Cold War period.
Questions about sphere of influence run throughout 1879-1980. The First Moroccan Crisis was the outcome of Germany challenging French authority in Morocco and ending the agreement between France and Britain, the Entente Cordial.
However, the Algeciras conference reinstated French rights in Morocco leaving Germany humiliated. This was the turning point as it impacted international relations and the balance of power to a greater extent than the other events.
The Crisis resulted in the collapse of collective security, known as the Concert of Europe. Since Germany abandoned diplomacy as a means to solve disputes, future conflicts became more tense and difficult to solve such as the July Crisis (1914). German refusal to attend a conference led to mobilisation which triggered the alliance system.
Therefore the origins of WW1 can be traced back to the Moroccan Crisis as it heightened German aggression; therefore the Moroccan Crisis can be credited for creating lasting change as its consequences were so long reaching.
France and Britain were clearly antagonised by German interference in colonial affairs. Germany’s imperial ambitions, demonstrated in the Crisis, were seen as challenges to British superiority. This directly led to the Anglo-Russian Entente as Britain identified Germany as the larger threat, not Russia.
This is an important change as it marked the end of splendid isolation as Europe, not Empire, was the focal point of British foreign policy. Consequently Russian influence increased. Following their defeat in the Sino-Soviet war, Russia benefited from allying with Britain.
Furthermore, their agreement cemented the Triple Entente. This is significant as now two rival alliance systems were established making the Concert of Europe unworkable. Germany felt “far less secure than it had been in 1890” which is paramount as it undid Bismarck’s work of ensuring German security[6].
Despite nothing coming to fruition, military discussions between France and Britain highlight the growing tension in international relations. This marks the Moroccan Crisis as a turning point as it escalated tension and created the two opposing sides making war seem likely.
The formation of the Triple Entente forced Germany to “cling more closely to Austria.” [7] This suggests a decrease in German power as they were now more dependent on Austrian support thus strengthening the Dual Alliance. German reliance infused Austrian aggression in the Balkans as seen in the Bosnian Crisis (1908), inevitably fuelling Russian anger – their traditional rival in the region.
Therefore the Moroccan Crisis had long term consequences as it led to reckless behaviour from Austria which destabilised the Balkan region – a key element in inducing war. Furthermore, The Moroccan Crisis can be seen as a turning point as it fuelled Kaiser Wilhelm’s desire for Weltpolitik, world power.
After securing economic rights in Morocco and gaining colonies in Africa, it inadvertently heightened his aggression which prompted future disputes such as the Second Moroccan Crisis.
The First Moroccan Crisis was “an important element in international tension”[8]. The collapse of the Concert of Europe and the formation of rival alliances were essential to creating a divide in Europe. At this point Germany was very confrontational and alienated in international relations.
In comparison to the Missile Crisis, the Moroccan Crisis altered the balance of power dramatically. Although it did not lead to immediate warfare, it was a catalyst in preparing the ground for war unlike the Missile Crisis, whose consequences may have been the avoidance of nuclear war.
The Détente period saw a relaxation in Cold War tension which led to events such as Nixon’s visit to China. This was significant to a greater extent than the Missile Crisis. America’s recognition of China as a state increased Chinese power and heightened their desire for Détente.
The Sino-American Détente allowed economic trade to arise which increased to $700 million by 1973. Growing trade prospects changed international relations as there was no longer a communist bloc in Asia.
China had previously depended on Soviet aid and now required American economic support. This is a significant change in the balance of power as China now saw Russia as a greater threat than America.
Furthermore, Nixon exploited the resulting Sino-Soviet split in order to “play the two states off against one another.”[9] Improved US-Sino relations forced a Soviet Détente. This formed “a triangular relationship between Washington, Beijing and Moscow.”[10] This is significant as the Superpowers recognised growing Chinese influence in international relations.
Additionally, improved relations granted China a seat on the UN Security Council. America willingly risking two vetoes, by the USSR and China, was a clear demonstration that they were keen to achieve Détente.
Nevertheless, America was still highly influential as they were able to “flex their diplomatic muscles in the Middle East rather than the UN solving them” highlighting that America still dominated international relations within and beyond the UN[11]. This implies that the visit to China produced more continuity as American superiority in international relations was not significantly challenged.
Yet, both nations were still “wary of each other”[12] over Taiwan. Nixon’s ‘Two-China’ policy created friction between America and China. However, Nixon’s willingness to replace Taiwan with China on the UN Security Council suggests that he was accommodating to Chinese needs – an important shift in the balance of power.
Sino-American relations also struck fear of isolation in Japan and Taiwan who sought to improve relations with China, a milestone in Eastern Asian relations. In comparison to the Missile Crisis, Nixon’s visit to China was more impactful on international relations as it greatly increased American influence Asia. The visit increased American power as they now had friendly relations with two protagonists in Asia: China and Japan.
The visit was significant as it was essential in ending the Vietnam War. Contrastingly, the Missile Crisis produced continuity as American influence was not challenged in that region.
Prior to WWII many disputes and agreements focused on limiting German growth and the final attempt in checking German aggression was The Stresa Front Agreement between Britain, France and Italy.
The pact failed to deter Hitler as he was “confident that there was sufficient distrust between the countries involved to ensure the pacts were meaningless.”[13] It had limitations as its terms were unspecified therefore commitment was weak. Italy’s imperial ambitions conflicted with British and French ideas of managing Germany.
The formation of the Front improved Anglo-French relations which had minimal effect on international relations as there was more continuity than change. The Stresa Front slightly changed the balance of power as it was an anti-German alliance.
However, pressure put on Germany was short-lived as “Britain took the first step to fragmenting the Stresa Front.”[14] The Anglo-German Naval Agreement undermined the Front and highlighted its fragility as it contradicted its main objective: checking German power. This contradicted the Front and revised the Treaty of Versailles.
The Naval Agreement allowed Britain to successfully avoid another Naval Arms Race with Germany thus reaffirming British superiority; therefore, there was little change in the balance of power.
The aftermath of Stresa “marked a key turning point in [Europe’s] relation to Germany. Balance of power shifted dramatically to the latter.”[15] This historian supports the idea that the Stresa Front agreement itself had limitations and did not greatly alter the balance of power the aftermath of the Crisis created lasting change.
The events following the Front that ultimately led to its collapse had a greater impact on international relations than the Front itself. Moreover, the idea that the balance of power dramatically swayed in Germany’s favour can be criticised.
The Abyssinian crisis, a direct consequence of the Front, moderately improved Italian-German relations. In the short-term it gave Hitler an ally however Italy’s fickleness, demonstrated in Algeciras following the Moroccan Crisis, devalued them as a German ally.
Therefore, balance of power did not sway in Germany’s favour. The Stresa Front had limited impact on the balance of power and failed to diffuse German aggression. The Missile Crisis was more impactful on international relations as it avoided a nuclear holocaust and led to the stricter regulations on nuclear weapons, therefore, it produced more change than the Front.
All four events impacted international relations and the balance of power, some to a greater extent than others. The Missile Crisis was significant however its short term consequences limit its significance to the Cold War period. It was more impactful than the Stresa Front, although it failed to transform international relations to the same degree as Nixon’s visit to China or to a greater extent that the Moroccan Crisis.
The Moroccan Crisis was the key turning point during this period as the outcome created greater change than continuity. It was momentous and was “a true crisis, and a turning point in European history.”[16]
By Libin Farah
Reference:
[2] Norman Lowe, Modern World History, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) pg. 139
[3] Hugh Williams, Fifty Things You Need To Know About World History, (London: HarperCollins Publisher, 1010 pg. 146
[4] Keely Rogers, 20th Century History – The Cold War, (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2008) pg. 100
[5] Tony Howarth, Twentieth Century History The World Since 1900 2nd Edition, (UK: Longman Group, 1987) pg. 247
[6] Alan Farmer and Vivienne Sanders, An Introduction to Modern European History 1890-1990, (London: Hodder Education, 2000) pg. 48
[7] B. H. Liddell Hart, A History of the First World War, (London: Pan MacMillan, 2014) pg. 15
[8] H.W. Koch, The Origins of the First World War. Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims, (London: Pan MacMillan, 1972) pg. 312
[9] Derrick Murphy and Terry Morris, International Relations 1879-2004, (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008) pg. 175
[10] Royal Airforce Museum, Sino-Soviet split, Date Accessed: 23rd October 2015 http://www.nationalcoldwarexhibition.org/schools-colleges/national-curriculum/detente/sino-soviet-split.aspx
[11] C N Trueman, The United Nations and its problems, The History Learning Site, Date Accessed: 12th October 2015, http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-united-nations/the-united-nations-and-its-problems/
[12] Alan Farmer pg.230
[13] Graham Darby, Hitler, Appeasement and the Road To War, (London: Hodder Education, 2007)
[14] Malcolm Pearce and Geoffrey Stewart, British Political History 1876-2001 Democracy and Decline 3rd Edition, (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 2002) pg. 315
[15] Pearce and Stewart pg. 315
[16] D.G. Williamson, War and Peace: International Relations 1878-1941 3rd Edition, (London: Hodder Education, 2010) pg. 42