Considering The Status of The Historical Evidence, What Was The Short-Term Significance of The Suez Crisis from 1956-67?
The Suez Crisis is regarded by many as an event that had highlighted the progression from the Imperial age to Cold War politics in the Middle East. The Crisis occurred in 1956 when Egyptian President Nasser nationalised the canal triggering joint Anglo-French-Israeli military intervention to regain the canal by attacking Suez.
The Crisis had multiple outcomes that affected international relations and the balance of power in the short term. Short term significance refers to the immediate impact of the event from 1956-67. The invasion of Suez had severely damaged British prestige and weakened their influence in the region.
Consequently, a power vacuum emerged which opened up a new arena for the Superpowers to exert influence. The Arab nationalism movement strengthened after the nationalisation of the canal as did anti-Zionism. Subsequently Israel improved their army which became the most powerful in the region.
The Suez Crisis made Nasser an icon in the Middle East and he became the face of Arab nationalism. Nasser’s resistance against imperialists propelled his image in the Arab world as “The Suez crisis became a symbol for anti-western defiance.”
He “claimed a political victory within a military defeat.” Nasser’s speech (Source 4) gave momentum to Arab Nationalism. Many Middle Eastern countries were newly independent therefore patriotism and the unification of Arab states seemed appealing.
This is evident by the formation of the Arab League; a council that unified Arab leaders who made a mutual defence military alliance. Their traditional rival in the region was Israel, which is reflected in Source 6, and therefore it could be interpreted that this alliance was a direct response to Israeli military superiority, which is outlined in Source 5.
Indeed the persuasive tone and emotive language of Source 4, “deeply-rooted factor in the heart and mind of the Arab nation”, was broadcast through the Arab world’s largest radio station “Voice of the Arabs” and would appeal to Arab people.
Nasser was the driving force behind the radio giving him a platform to promote his Arab nationalist and anti-Zionist views. By 1962 it was the most dominant broadcaster in the region which highlights the magnitude of Source 4 as it was so far reaching.
Arab nationalism peaked following the Suez Crisis with the creation of the United Arab Republic, the unification of Egypt and Syria in 1958 as well as the Arab Federation, a brief union between Jordan and Iraq.
However, the desire for unification should not be exaggerated as it was limited to only a few countries. The Lebanese leader Camille Chamoun was “conspicuously anti-Nasserist and pro-Western.”
The unification was short-lived and “left a legacy of distrust and resentment.” Source 5 also questions the strength of Arab nationalism and suggests that there is enough hostility between the Arab nations to cause disunity and weaken Arab nationalism.
During the 1950s “inter-Arab relations oscillated from consensus to disagreement, especially under Nasser’s Pan-Arab” and therefore is not a significant threat to Israel making Arab nationalism unachievable.
Source 4 is strongly reliable as Nasser genuinely believed in Pan-Arabism and was optimistic that unification would have beneficial outcomes.
Israel became the dominant military force in the region following the Suez Crisis. During the Suez war Israel successfully occupied the Sinai Peninsula. This was highly significant as it was a crushing blow to Arab nationalism.
This is supported by Source 5 which claims that the “Arab states will not rush to one another’s assistance” regarding territorial occupation implying that Arab nationalism is not that great of a threat and can be undermined by Israeli forces.
Moreover, Source 5 acknowledges Israeli military supremacy in the region in comparison to its neighbouring Arab states. Source 5 states that Israel had a “safe margin of superiority” over Arab aggressors which swayed the balance of power towards Israel.
This is directly challenged by Source 6 which illustrates Israel as vulnerable compared to the Arab nations who display a united front. Therefore, the reliability of Source 6 can be questioned.
The cartoon depicts Arab states as barrels that are uniting against their common enemy Israel. This shows the strength of Arab nationalism however Israel was the dominant military force in the Middle East as demonstrated in the Six Day war where they occupied the Gaza strip, Sinai Peninsula and the West Bank.
As the cartoon was published by an Arab newspaper the illustrator may have wanted to create an image favours Arab states and disregard Israeli military strengths which weakens the credibility of the source. Source 5 is largely reliable because its assessment of Israeli military strength is based on evidence as it was written in 1967.
Source 2 also recognises that existing tension between Israel and Arab states has “intensified” following the Suez Crisis. Similarity anti-Zionist sentiments had strengthened as a result of the Suez Crisis and Nasser’s speech.
Source 4 implies that nationalism complements anti-Zionism and that Arab nationalism increases when it “felt the threat of danger” from Israel. Although Israel achieved many military victories, Arab nationalism continued to pose a threat to their security.
Nevertheless the Suez war and the Six day war both had beneficial outcomes for Israel. This war “united the country and brought millions of US dollars as well as curing her unemployment problem.” Therefore Israel was making territorial and economic gains due to their military superiority in the Middle East.
The Suez Crisis highlighted growing Soviet and American interest in the Middle East as demonstrated in Source 2 and 3.
Prior to the Suez Crisis, Nasser purchased arms from a Soviet satellite state and when Khrushchev agreed to fund the Aswan Dam project their friendship strengthened.
Similarly, the US had close ties with Israel and provided substantial economic and military aid. This benefited the US greatly as Israel was the military force in the region, which is echoed in Source 5.
Following the Suez Crisis there was a power vacuum in the region therefore the Superpowers were competing to exert influence. The Middle East became an arena for Cold War politics which was heightened following the Suez Crisis.
“The Arabs became more willing to seek Soviet aid” following the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion as they had suffered decades of imperial rule. This is echoed by Source 3 which notes that that Soviet influence increased in the region among “Egyptian people and those in other countries that were freeing themselves from colonial dependence.”
USSR became Egypt’s main ally after the Suez Crisis which is a significant change in international relations as the Soviets now had strong ties with the main protagonist in Arab politics.
However the reliability of Source 3 can be contested as Khrushchev claims that his support for Nasser following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal drew Nasser “closer to the Soviet Union” and he had the utmost respect for “our policies and for our Soviet socialist system”.
This is directly challenged by Source 4 in which Nasser claims neutrality and would “not ally itself with either of the major powers.” This significantly reduces the credibility of Source 3 as Nasser was a firm believer in an independent state.
Source 2 outlines the Eisenhower Doctrine whereby the USA would provide military and economic aid to countries resisting communist aggression. Eisenhower warns Eden in Source 1, regarding the invasion of Suez that “initial military successes might be easy, but the eventual price might become far too heavy.”
The price Eisenhower is referring to may be the Cold War. Eisenhower feared the invasion would drive Nasser closer to Khrushchev. Eisenhower was trying to gain influence by offering the protection of Arab states from the USSR and portraying Communism as a threat.
The language in Source 2 is crafted so that the outcomes of the Suez Crisis are all linked to Communism. “All this instability has been heightened and, at times, manipulated by International Communism.”
Furthermore, “Arab-Israeli conflict now had wider Cold War implications.” The USA had fought with communists in Korea, the French were battling against the Viet Minh and China was newly communist.
Therefore America was eager to resist a communist insurgency in the Middle East. Additionally, Eisenhower had a reputation to uphold and as his speech was two months after his re-election, he wanted to showcase a tough stance on Communism.
The reliability of Khrushchev’s account in Source 3 can be questioned as it is heavily dependent on memory. Khrushchev’s strong political bias limits the usefulness of the source as his perspective is clearly one that favours the policies and actions of the USSR.
However, Khrushchev is fairly balanced in his account as he credits Eisenhower’s increasing influence in the region which adds strength to Source 3.
The Suez Crisis concluded with British, French and Israeli troops withdrawing from Suez. Eisenhower strongly condemned the invasion and as the USA was the senior partner in the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ Britain was forced to leave Suez.
Eisenhower was strongly against the Suez War because due to the Cold War context he wanted to prevent Middle Eastern countries developing links with the Soviet Union. The Crisis “cemented the idea that Britain needed American friendship and assistance to maintain its position in the world.”
It was a clear indication that Britain could no longer use coercion as a means to exert influence like they had done previously during height of the Imperial era.
This is supported by Source 1, “to protect national or individual investors” which shows that Britain could no longer aggressively pursue its individualistic goals. This is reinforced by Source 2 whereby Eisenhower pledges to give “added strength to assure their continued independence” and protect them from Imperialists.
Source 1 a private letter between Eisenhower and Eden. Eisenhower’s language, “I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my conviction”, is firm indicating that he recognises that the balance of power had shifted in his favour.
Source 1 is strongly reliable as it was written in confidence. International prestige was defined by colonial power therefore the Suez Crisis was a significant blow to British prestige as it signalled the shift in the balance of power away from imperial powers towards the Superpowers.
Significantly, “Britain’s collapse weakened Iraq and Jordan, and left them vulnerable to Nasser’s propaganda.” Consequently the Arab Federation was formed to protect the interests of Jordan and Iraq.
Therefore, the weakening of British power was momentous as it highlighted the limitations of Arab nationalism, which challenges Source 4. Nevertheless, the balance of power swayed towards the Arabs states as they were free of colonial rule.
These states were able to exercise and guarantee their independence and security by forming the Non Aligned Movement in 1961. It was founded “during the collapse of the colonial system and the independence struggles” and was extremely significant as it demonstrated newly independent countries taking a stand against colonial powers.
Britain’s influence was also challenged in Iraq as the pro-British King was replaced with a republic which shows the magnitude of Arab nationalism. Additionally, the Crisis heightened anti-western sentiments which helped propel Arab nationalism (Source 4).
Therefore, declining British power was significant in the short term as it gave Arab states the right to exercise their freedom and liberties.
In conclusion, the Suez Crisis had multiple outcomes that altered the status of the Middle East. While questions of reliability affect Source 3 it is still a highly credible source along with Source 1, 2 and 4 as they are directly from the protagonists of the Crisis.
Despite its decline following the Six day war, the unifying impact Arab nationalism had in the short term cannot be ignored. The decline in British power illustrated through Source 1 showed that Britain had to accept the new world order of Cold War politics dominating international relations.
Israeli military superiority, in Source 5 and 6, highlight their dominance and little could be done to challenge it. Perhaps of greatest significance is American and Soviet interest in the Middle East, demonstrated in Source 2 and 3. The Suez Crisis evolved from an anti-imperial battle to a Cold War conflict which highlights the magnitude of Cold War politics.
By Libin Farah
Reference:
William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006) pg. 11
2 Michael Scott-Baumann, Conflict in the Middle East: Israel and the Arabs 2nd Edition, (London, Hodder Education, 2007) pg. 23
3Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004) pg. 37
4 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict sixth edition, (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillian, 2007) pg. 266
5 P. J. Vatikiotis, Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East, (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2015) pg. 159
6 Scott-Baumann pg. 26
7 Michael Scott-Baumann, Crisis in the Middle East: Israel and the Arab States 1945-2001, (London: Hodder Education, 2009) pg. 44
8 Jean Bottaro, The Arab-Israeli Conflict 1945-79, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pg. 110
9 Edward, pg. 252
10 http://www.britannica.com/topic/Non-Aligned-Movement